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I. 
 
Developments in the history of science often find expression in commentaries on texts that 
are considered classical in one way or another. Such commentaries may go beyond the 
fundamental texts they comment upon, but often under the pretense that they don't. The 
fundamental text, it is claimed, contains in condensed form what the commentaries bring 
out.1 
 The question to be considered is whether and to what extent this manner of 
presentation, there where it is used, can have an effect on the contents of the science 
concerned. Is it conceivable that the clothes in which the baby is dressed end up changing 
the baby herself? Could it be that the history of science is to some extent determined by the 
form of expression used by its representatives? According to at least one theory this can 
happen, and has actually happened in literate old-world societies. It claims that the methods 
used by premodern commentators show a certain invariance. A small number of 
hermeneutic techniques is presumably used repeatedly in successive layers of tradition, 
resulting in the growth of religious and philosophical systems that are similar to each other 
across cultural boundaries, in spite of the fact that the classical texts on which the 
commentaries are ultimately based can be very different from each other. These systems, 
according to this theory, stay in place until their final collapse under their own weight, so to 
say, having approached maximum levels of complexity and systematic integrity. This 
happened in Europe in the early modern scientific era; in China something similar was on 
its way. 
 This theory, if correct, might have consequences for our understanding of the 
history of science in different cultural areas. It finds expression in a number of publications 
from the hand of Steve Farmer: one — a book on the European Renaissance author Pico 
(Giovanni Pico della Mirandola) — by him alone, another one an article written in 
                         
1 Note the verse that occurs in Kumårila’s Tantravårttika on M¥måµsåsËtra 2.16 (M¥måµsådarßana, 
Anandashrama edn. vol 2 p. 180): sËtre∑v eva hi tat sarvaµ yad v®ttau yac ca vårttike / sËtraµ yonir 
ihårthånåµ sarvaµ sËtre prati∑†hitam // “whatever is found in the commentaries and in the Vårttikas is already 
(inherent) in the SËtras. The SËtra is the origin of all meanings, and therefore everything is founded on the 
SËtra” (tr. Deshpande, 1998: 22). 
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collaboration with the Sinologist John B. Henderson, and two further articles by these two 
and the Indologist Michael Witzel.2 These publications base themselves on materials from a 
variety of cultures, but primarily from premodern western Europe, from China, and, to a 
lesser extent, from India and other cultures.3 The first part of this paper is meant to critically 
reflect on the applicability of this theory to the Indian situation. 
 In order to do so, we have to get some more clarity as to its exact content. What, 
according to this theory, do commentators do? And what exactly is the presumed outcome 
of this commentatorial actitivy? 
 Commentators, according to the theory under consideration, were confronted with 
the task of reconciling or “syncretizing” traditions, especially so during epochs in which 
pressures to harmonize traditions were intense (FHR p. 2). They had to free authoritative 
traditions from internal contradictions or to harmonize them with foreign traditions. One 
way to attain this goal is the introduction of “scholastic distinctions”, for example levels in 
heaven and hell (FHR p. 3). This process repeated itself numerous times, since the outcome 
of a preceding “layer” of commentatorial activity is the basis for the next one. Each new 
layer of tradition, whether embodied in canonical texts or later commentaries, tended to 
transform the products of earlier strata in predictable ways (FHR p. 5). We can therefore 
speak of the repetitive application to sacred and semisacred traditions of a relatively small, 
and largely culturally invariant, series of commentatorial techniques. The commentators 
were obliged, not only to syncretize opposing or foreign traditions, but also to harmonize 
conflicting layers of canonical texts (FHR p. 6). 
 The results of this multi-layered commentatorial activity could generate, among 
other things, abstract pantheons of gods, monotheistic deities, or abstract ehtical or 
cosmological principles. In later traditions, our authors maintain, typical products included 
dualistic or trinitarian concepts of deity, broad systems of correspondences, multileveled 
pictures of heaven or hell, elaborate emanational systems, and other diagnostic features of 
scholastic traditions. They add: “Over many centuries, higher-level integrations of 
structures like these gave birth to elaborate multilayered correlative systems — Neo-
Platonic, Neo-Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, or Christian cosmologies, etc. — 
whose levels of self-similarity tended to increase whenever those traditions inbred and grew 
in complexity.” (FHR p. 6). 
                         
2 The contribution of the fourth author, Peter Robinson, appears to have been the creation of computer 
simulations meant to check the model. 
3 FHR p. 1: “The model originally arose out of textual studies of European and Chinese cosmological 
traditions, but its ideas are supported as well by data from premodern India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, 
and pre- and early-colonial Mesoamerica.” 
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In order to test this theory against the Indian evidence, we first have to make some choices. 
In this paper I will confine myself to philosophical and scientific traditions linked to 
Brahmanism. Developments in “popular” Hinduism will not be considered, and indeed, one 
wonders whether the theory covers these developments, which were not always 
accompanied by commentatorial traditions and certainly not created by them. Buddhism, 
too, will be left out, to the extent possible; we will see below that it is not possible to ignore 
Buddhism altogether. 
 With regard to the theory itself, too, we will introduce some limitations. Farmer c.s. 
mention among the byproducts of iterated exegetical processes the appearance of 
correlative cosmologies, “high-correlative thought” as they sometimes call it. This effect is, 
as far as I can see, not at all applicable to the Indian situation, where high-correlative 
thought is most prominent in the Vedic texts, and much less important in later 
developments.4 
 Which are the sacred texts of Brahmanism? No doubt the Veda, a corpus that was 
obtaining canonical status near the beginning of the Common Era, constitutes a major part 
of them. All “orthodox” authors claim adherence to this corpus (or are believed to do so 
implicitly). The question we have to address is: can subsequent developments in philosophy 
be looked upon as due to the iterated activity of commentators on the Vedic corpus? The 
answer is simple: no, it cannot. In spite of its exalted status, the Vedic corpus was very little 
studied for its contents. Commentaries on some of its parts exist, but they are few in 
number and have not exerted much, if any, influence on other areas of reflection.5 Most of 
the philosophical schools of Brahmanism pay lip-service to its superior position. The school 
of hermeneutics called M¥måµså whose only reason of existence was the analysis of the 
Vedic texts was only interested in the ritual prescriptions it could find in them. All other 
Vedic statements were not taken literally. The ideas which it accepted were not even in 
theory derived from the Vedic texts. 
 There is one partial exception to the above. Roughly from the second half of the first 
millennium C. E. onward another school of Vedic hermeneutics arose which was interested 
                         
4 Witzel (2004) proposes — while referring to Farmer et al., 2000 — to look upon the “Ùgvedic religious 
system” as the result of “attempts at changing and ‘updating’ an older pre-Vedic system in  accordance with 
local religious, social and political developments that eventually led to the post-Ùgvedic continuation of 
speculation, and even more significantly, to the classification in the post-ÙV period of the Írauta system with 
its stress on a rather restricted ‘access to heaven’” (p. 626). But does he seriously believe that there is here 
question of the iterated activity of commentators, of a small number of hermeneutic techniques used 
repeatedly in successive layers of tradition? Where Farmer and Henderson appear to be speaking specifically 
of commentatorial traditions, Witzel here seems to widen the theory so as to cover all religious developments, 
with or without commentaries. 
5 Cf. Gonda, 1975: 39 ff.; Dandekar, 1990. 
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in the factual contents of at least some parts of the Veda. This is the one known by the 
name Vedånta (better perhaps, Vedåntism), which argued that some factual Vedic 
statements are to be taken literally. These are the sentences found in the Vedic Upani∑ads 
that speak about brahman, the highest principle, and the nature of the soul. These sentences 
are made the basis of a philosophy which is claimed to be derived from the Veda. Vedånta 
became important in the second millennium of the Common Era, and split into a number of 
schools. The most famous early representative of the school called Advaita Vedånta is 
Ía∫kara (around the year 700 C. E.), nowadays probably the best-known thinker of 
classical India. Farmer c.s. refer to Ía∫kara as a confirmation of their theory from India. 
They do so, for example, where they wish to emphasize the links between exegetical 
processes and the evolution of religious and philosophical systems.6 The value of this 
example is however dubious. Ía∫kara's school of thought, Advaita Vedånta, considered 
itself, and presented itself as, an improved version of the M¥måµså already mentioned. 
Vedånta, too, is a form of M¥måµså, sometimes calling itself Brahma-M¥måµså. In 
principle it accepted the ideas of the old ritual M¥måµså which, as we have already seen, 
were not even in theory derived from the Veda. To this it merely added some elements, 
most important among them the conviction that there are after all a few factual statements 
in the Veda — viz., the Upani∑adic statements about brahman — that should be taken 
literally.7 The world view that arises from this mixture is largely determined by exegetical 
considerations, yet it is not the byproduct of the iterated application of exegetical 
techniques. The connection between world view and hermeneutics in this case exists, but 
does not correspond to the model of layered texts and iterated exegetical techniques. 
 Farmer c.s. also make much of the “double-truth” sponsored by Ía∫kara and his 
commentators. The double-truth, they point out, is a useful exegetical device in syncretic 
systems which allows the absorption of contradictory features. Now it may indeed be 
argued — even though Farmer c.s. do not do so explicitly — that Ía∫kara's system is 
syncretic. Other Sanskrit commentators accused him of being a pseudo-Buddhist, and it is 
clear that many elements of his thought have Buddhist roots. This does not however mean 
that Ía∫kara accepted the Buddhist canonical texts. He was not a commentator who 
accepted the classical Buddhist texts in the repertoire he commented upon, or who wished 
to reconcile the ideas of Buddhists and Brahmins. Quite on the contrary, Ía∫kara was a 
fierce critic of Buddhism, who had no respect whatsoever for their canonical texts.8 If he 
                         
6 E. g. FHR p. 19 
7 Bronkhorst, 2006. 
8 Alston, 1989: 251-313. 
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used some of their ideas, he did so without any acknowledgment. He did not need double-
truth in order to find place for Buddhist thought. As a matter of fact, he had borrowed the 
idea of double-truth itself from the Buddhists. The Buddhists had introduced it, probably 
already during the centuries preceding the Common Era, but not in order to make place for 
two different world views which they wished to reconcile. They had introduced it to make 
sense of their first attempts at systematizing, which had provided them with a coherent 
world view which however had few points of resemblance with the common sense view of 
the world. They had resolved this by stipulating that the common sense world view is not 
quite as true as the theoretical one they had developed. This double-truth had accompanied 
Buddhist thought until the time of Ía∫kara and beyond. It was not the result of exegetical 
processes trying to reconcile different traditions. 
 
It may be clear from the above that the history of Vedic exegesis does not easily fit the 
model presented by Farmer and others. However, the Vedic corpus was not the only corpus 
which was invested with canonical status within the Brahmanical tradition. A subsequent 
stage of this tradition found expression in the Puråˆas, a large number of texts of great 
length. Contrary to the Veda the texts in this corpus were read by numerous Hindus. For 
our present purposes it is particularly interesting to note that these Puråˆas presented a view 
of the universe that was completely different from the one advocated by the practitioners of 
astronomy during the same period who followed the astronomical Siddhåntas. It is not 
necessary to go into details, but the inconsistencies between the Puråˆic and Siddhåntic 
cosmologies strike the eye: in the former the earth is flat, while in the latter it is a globe; in 
the first it has a huge size, in the second it has a manageably small size.9 One might expect 
that these inconsistencies provide us with the situation in which commentators are under 
pressure to reconcile the two different views, thus acting in the way envisaged in the model 
of Farmer c.s. What really happened does not however fit the model all that easily. 
 Minkowski (2001: 82) gives the following brief résumé of what happened (with a 
reference to Pingree 1990: 279): 
 
As far as we know, [the] mutual inconsistency [between the Puråˆic and Siddhåntic 
cosmologies] passed largely undiscussed until the mid-9th century, when the 
astronomer Lalla turned to a critique of the Puråˆic model in his Siddhånta, the 
Íi∑yadh¥v®ddhidatantra. Lalla did attempt to accomodate some elements of the 
Puråˆic model to the globular earth of the Siddhåntas: Mt. Meru is made the axis 
inside the earth on which the earth revolves; all the other oceans and continents of 
the Puråˆic model are assumed to be south of the equator; and the power that drives 
                         
9 Minkowski, 2001: 82. 
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the internesting spheres is still the Pravaha wind, which is the force that makes the 
planets and stars revolve around Meru in the Puråˆic model. 
 Nevertheless Lalla explicitly rejected the improbable Puråˆic assertions that 
eclipses are caused by Råhu; that night is caused by Meru blocking the Sun; that the 
Moon wanes because the gods are drinking the Soma in the moon; that the Moon is 
higher in the heavens than the Sun is; and that the earth is flat and rests on a support. 
These criticisms are repeated in later Siddhåntas, especially in Bhåskara II's very 
influential work, the Siddhåntaßiromaˆi, of the 12th century ... 
 
It is clear from this résumé that, far from completely reconciling the two traditions, Lalla 
and his successors did not shy away from straightout rejecting certain aspects of Puråˆic 
cosmology. Attempts at reconciliation at any cost do make their appearance later on, 
apparently from the sixteenth century onward. These attempts, however, never gave rise to 
the process of iterated application of exegetical techniques10 which underlies the model of 
Farmer c.s., for the battle for reconciliation was far from won. The nineteenth century in 
particular saw a vivid exchange of treatises in Sanskrit and other languages about the 
question whether and to what extent the two cosmologies were compatable.11 
 This example from astronomy raises the question to what extent Indian 
commentators in the Brahmanical tradition saw it as their task to reconcile contradictions 
and inconsistencies. The astronomical example suggests that this tendency became stronger 
during the last few centuries, perhaps from the middle of the second millennium onward. 
Before this time commentators may have been comfortable with unresolvable 
inconsistencies between different schools of thought. This, if true, would exclude the 
literary traditions of South Asia from the regularities which presumably characterize such 
traditions elsewhere. And the effects that commentaries might have had on the contents of 
the sciences would not take the form we would expect on the basis of the theory of Farmer, 
Henderson and Witzel. 
                         
10 Concerning the exegetical techniques themselves, Minkowski (2004: 351) describes them in the following 
manner: “removal of contradiction can conceivably be done in a variety of ways. Some of our authors simply 
refute one or the other of the contradictory views as untruth or illogic, hence leaving the field to the other 
view and in that way removing any contradiction. Others accord different levels of truth to the two positions, 
saying that one describes practical, the other, ultimate reality. A related removal of inconsistency is done by 
putting the two positions on different planes of reality by appeal to their purpose, one being for timings of 
mundane affairs, the other for soteriological aims. Some adopt an exegetical strategy, according one of the 
two views a higher truth, but reading its texts so that they only confirm what the other view already maintains. 
Others assume that both views have the same subject and purpose on the same plane, and actually adjust and 
revise doctrines so that they conform to each other. Some of our authors resort to combining several of these 
theoretical approaches.” 
11 See especially Minkowski, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004. 
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II. 
 
Are there other ways in which the use of commentaries might have affected the contents of 
the sciences in India? I suspect there may be one, but in order to appreciate it we have to 
concentrate on some of the peculiarities of the South Asian situation and keep universalistic 
ambitions for the time being in check. Of the South Asian sciences linguistics is the one 
that came to occupy a central position in literate culture. The study of grammar in 
particular, preferably the grammar of Påˆini, became part of the educational curriculum of 
all those who aspired for higher knowledge. The early commentaries on this grammar were 
looked upon as examples and prototypes of what commentaries should look like. 
 The earliest surviving commentary on Påˆini's grammar is the Great Commentary 
(Mahåbhå∑ya) of Patañjali.12 This Great Commentary dates from the second century before 
the Common Era, which is exceptionally early for an Indian commentary. It is also 
exceptional for another reason. This is not just a simple commentary that explains the 
words and direct meaning of the aphorisms that make up Påˆini's grammar; this knowledge 
is somehow taken for granted. No, it discusses the implications of certain rules, the 
consequences of applying them, their need in the grammar as a whole, etc. Occasionally it 
rejects a rule, or proposes emendations. For most of its history Påˆini's grammar was 
studied along with Patañjali's Great Commentary. The latter became the example of a 
certain type of commentary which was imitated in other fields of knowledge.13 
 The Great Commentary was not however the type of first-level commentary one 
needs to understand the rules. It presupposes such an understanding, which indicates that 
traditional explanations of the rules existed already before its time. Whether these early 
traditional explanations existed in the form of complete commentaries we do not know for 
certain. We do know that the Great Commentary had some clear ideas as to what such a 
commentary should contain. An explanation, it states, is not just the words of the rule 
repeated, this time separated from each other; it also includes one or more examples, 
counterexamples, and the completion of the utterance by supplying words.14 Later 
commentators, both inside and outside the grammatical tradition, took these remarks to 
                         
12 I do not here discuss the vårttikas of Kåtyåyana and others that are contained in the Mahåbhå∑ya; their 
character was not fully understood for some time; cf. Bronkhorst, 1990. 
13 Bronkhorst, 1990; 1991. 
14 Mahå-bh I p. 11 l. 22-23; p. 12 l. 24-26: na kevalåni carcåpadåni vyåkhyånaµ v®ddhi˙ åt aij iti / kiµ tarhi / 
udåharaˆaµ pratyudåharaˆaµ våkyådhyåhåra ity etat samuditaµ vyåkhyånaµ bhavati //. Cf. Joshi & 
Roodbergen, 1986: 162-163. 
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heart and composed commentaries of this kind, sometimes with an admixture of elements 
taken from Patañjali's Great Commentary. 
 An explanation of the kind proposed by Patañjali fulfills the basic needs of a user of 
Påˆini's grammar. Separating the words of the rule concerned is required because the way 
words are joined in Sanskrit might easily give rise to ambiguities in rules as condensed as 
those that constitute this grammar. Supplying words, too, is a requirement that results from 
the condensed way the rule has been presented to begin with. But an explanation should do 
more than only disambiguating the wording of the rules. By giving one or more examples it 
illustrates what the rule is for; counterexamples make clear which are its limits of 
applicability. Armed with the understanding thus provided it is possible to proceed to other 
issues, like those discussed in Patañjali's Great Commentary. 
 Suppose now that one were to follow Patañjali's suggestions in explaining a rule of 
geometry, say, the theorem of Pythagoras (for a rectangular triangle the lengths of the sides 
a, b and c obey the rule a
2
 + b
2
 = c
2
). The verbal presentation of the theorem should first be 
made clear by separating the words and supplying further words that may be required for a 
full understanding. Next it will be useful to give some concrete examples of triangles to 
which the theorem is applicable, such as a triangle with sides 3, 4 and 5. Counterexamples 
may similarly illustrate where the theorem is not applicable. 
 A commentary of this kind will no doubt be useful. However, it will not explain 
why we should accept the theorem of Pythagoras to begin with. There will be no proof of 
any kind. This is no problem in the case of a grammatical rule. Grammatical rules are not 
proven, whereas geometrical rules are. This, at any rate, is our view of the matter. But does 
it correspond to the way the early users of Sanskrit texts looked upon it? 
 Let us first look again at grammatical rules. They may not be in need of proof in the 
way a theorem of geometry is, but they are in need of justification. A grammatical rule that 
produces incorrect forms is incorrect, one that produces correct forms is correct. The kinds 
of justification we are looking for in the cases of grammar and geometry may be different, 
very different, but justification they need, both of them. The question is whether the early 
users of Påˆini's grammar would agree with us in this respect. Did they too, like us, think 
that grammatical rules are in need of justification? 
 There is a passage in Patañjali's Great Commentary which appears to show the 
opposite. A rule in Påˆini's grammar (P. 6.3.109) refers to a list of irregularly formed words 
of which it only specifies the first one, the others being indicated with the help of a laconic 
“etcetera” (°ådi). Challenged to explain which the other words are, Patañjali answers that 
the usage of educated people (ßi∑†a) is to be followed. Who are those educated people? 
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Patañjali's answer involves various elements: educated people are Brahmins who live in a 
certain region of the subcontinent, behave in certain ways, etc. But the for us most 
interesting part of this description is that they speak correct Sanskrit without having studied 
the A∑†ådhyåy¥, i.e., Påˆini's grammar. This grammar allows us in this way to identify 
educated Brahmins.15 Note that the educated Brahmins are not invoked to justify the rules 
of Påˆini's grammar, but the other way round: Påˆini's grammar, which is not in need of 
justification, allows us to identify educated Brahmins. Perhaps this is not surprising in view 
of the feeling of awe with which Patañjali refers to Påˆini. Later authors in the grammatical 
tradition extend this feeling of awe so as to include Patañjali.16 
 Let us now return to geometry.17 The earliest surviving commentary on a 
geometrical text is the one by Bhåskara I (completed at Valabh¥ in 629 C. E.). The text he 
comments upon is the Óryabha†¥ya, called after its author Óryabha†a (who was 23 years old 
in 499 C. E.). Its chapter entitled Gaˆitapåda deals with various mathematical topics, 
among them geometry. Bhåskara comments upon all of this. In the geometrical portions he 
provides explanations, diagrams, exercises, and whatever may be required to understand 
Óryabha†a's text. He does not however provide proofs or justifications. And most 
interestingly, he attributes to Óryabha†a supernatural powers.18 The parellelism with the 
commentatorial tradition on Påˆini's grammar is therefore perfect. 
 This characterization of Bhåskara's commentary is all the more striking in view of 
the fact that one year before it another treatise had been composed (at Bhillamåla or 
Bhinmal, near Mt. Abu, Rajasthan, in 628 C. E.), viz. Brahmagupta's 
Bråhmasphu†asiddhånta, which is not a commentary. Brahmagupta and Óryabha†a based 
their astronomical presentations on an earlier text, the Paitåmahasiddhånta. Of the two, 
Óryabha†a was less tradition-bound, for he revised several of its elements; he was severely 
criticized for this by Brahmagupta.19 Obviously Brahmagupta did not attribute supernatural 
powers to Óryabha†a. What is more, Brahmagupta was the more traditional of the two. 
                         
15 Mahå-bh III p. 174 l. 10-13: yadi tarhi ßi∑†å˙ ßabde∑u pramåˆaµ kim a∑†ådhyåy¥ kriyate / 
ßi∑†ajñånårthå∑†ådhyåy¥ / kathaµ punar a∑†ådhyåyyå ßi∑†å˙ ßakyå vijñåtum / a∑†ådhyåy¥m adh¥yåno 'nyaµ 
paßyaty anadh¥yånaµ ye 'tra vihitå˙ ßabdås tån prayuñjånam / “If these ßi∑†as are the decisive standard for 
correctness of language, then what is the function of Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥? Påˆini's grammar aims at helping 
one recognize these linguistic élites. How can the linguistic élites be recognized by means of Påˆini's 
grammar? A student of Påˆini's grammar observes another person who has never studied that grammar but 
who uses constructions taught in that grammar.” (tr. Deshpande, 1993: 97) 
16 Deshpande, 1993; 1998. 
17 Cp. Bronkhorst, 2001. 
18 Óryabha†a “sees things that are beyond the reach of the senses” (at¥ndriyårthadarßin; ÓryBh p. 189 ll. 14-
15); he has composed this work having pleased Brahmå with great ascetic practices (ÓryBh p. 11 l. 22-23: 
atha katham asyåt¥ndriyåˆåµ sphu†agrahagatyarthånåµ prådurbhåva˙? brahmaˆa˙ prasådeneti / evam 
anußrËyate: anenåcåryeˆa mahadbhis tapobhir brahmårådhita˙ /). 
19 Pingree, 1993. 
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 The twelfth chapter of the Bråhmasphu†asiddhånta is devoted to mathematics. Not 
being a commentary, this work is very condensed and, like the Óryabha†¥ya, it has no place 
for proofs. For the same reason it does not justify its geometrical theorems by taking 
recourse to an earlier authority, be it Óryabha†a or someone else. We may not know how 
exactly it arrived at the various theorems it proposes, but one thing is clear: it did not copy 
them from Óryabha†a. This is clear from a case where Óryabha†a had propounded an 
incorrect theorem, claiming that the volume of a pyramid is half the product of the height 
and the surface of the triangular base.20 Brahmagupta's Bråhmasphu†asiddhånta knows the 
correct formula: a third of this product.21 The commentator Bhåskara repeats Óryabha†a's 
error, apparently without being aware of it.22 
 What we have, then, is two authors — Bhåskara and Brahmagupta — who write at 
exactly the same time works that deal with the same subjects, among them geometry. One 
of these works contains a patent mistake, the other doesn't. The work with the mistake is a 
commentary, which repeats the mistake that it found in the work it comments upon. The 
other work, Brahmagupta's Bråhmasphu†asiddhånta, is independent, i.e., no commentary. 
The question is inevitable: Is Bhåskara less critical, less acute as a mathematician, because 
he is a commentator? Is he, as a commentator, more or less obliged to raise the author of 
the text he comments on to superhuman heights, sacrificing his own critical spirit in the 
process? Does he have to do so in spite of the fact that he comments on the work of a rebel 
who himself felt free to deviate from tradition? It is difficult to answer these questions with 
confidence. It is of course possible that Bhåskara was quite simply less bright than 
Brahmagupta, that he was not as gifted in geometry. It is conceivable that Brahmagupta, if 
he had decided to write a commentary on the Óryabha†¥ya, would have drawn attention to 
the errors it contains, as he does, as a matter of fact, on several occasions. It is also possible 
that he did not write a full commentary on that work because he was too bright. Or again, 
perhaps brightness plays no role here. Perhaps a commentator, by virtue of becoming a 
commentator, had to adjust to this role and somehow manage to fit the model, which 
implied respect for the tradition and, above all, for the author whose work he was 
commenting upon. 
                         
20 Óry Gaˆitapåda 6cd: Ërdhvabhujåtatsaµvargårdhaµ sa ghana˙ ∑a∂aßrir iti. Cf. Keller, 2006, I: 30 f.; II: 27 
f. 
21 Bråhmasphu†asiddhånta 12.44ab (ed. Sharma): k∑etraphalaµ vedhaguˆaµ samakhåtaphalaµ h®taµ tribhi˙ 
sËcyå˙ / “The volume of a pit of uniform depth is the area multiplied by the depth. This divided by three is the 
volume of a pyramid”; tr. Sarasvati Amma, 1999: 200, modified. 
22 So does the commentator N¥lakaˆ†ha, according to Sarasvati Amma (1999: 197 ff.). This is all the more 
surprising in that N¥lakaˆ†ha himself was innovative; cf. Pingree, 2001. 
COMMENTARIES AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE  11 
 
 
 One swallow does not make summer. One pair of scientists — of which one, the 
commentator Bhåskara, perpetuates an incorrect theorem, whereas the other, the 
independent author Brahmagupta, formulates the correct one — does not yet prove that 
writing commentaries has a dulling effect on the mind. It is however suggestive and, one 
hopes, it may encourage others to look for further evidence, both in India and elsewhere, 
that may bring clarity into this matter. The fact that Bhåskara and Brahmagupta were exact 
contemporaries who wrote about exactly the same things strongly suggests that their 
differences had little to do with the time in which they lived, or with the branch of 
knowledge in which they were active, but all the more with the genre of text they wrote. It 
creates the impression that writing a commentary implied more than choosing one out of a 
number of available literary genres.23 Rather, it appears to have meant choosing a literary 
genre, and along with it a certain mind set. Once again, it would be fascinating to test this 
impression against evidence from different cultures. 
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